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Legislative Activity and Private Benefits:
A Natural Experiment in New Zealand
We examine the causal effect of legislative activity on private benefits, which
have been largely neglected by previous research in legislative studies. By relying on
a natural experiment in New Zealand, where randomly selected MPs are given the
opportunity to propose legislation, we find evidence for a causal relation between
proposing a (successful) bill and the private benefits MPs receive, in terms of gifts and
payments for services. We conclude that the allocation of private benefits depends on
legislative performance.
Introduction
What are the benefits of legislative activity? Formal and empirical research in legislative
politics typically assumes that the main benefits are policy-oriented (Cox and McCubbins
2005; Krehbiel 1998; Martin 2004; Tsebelis 2002). In other words, by initiating legislation,
MPs move the status quo of the policy closer to their ideal point. Other important benefits
are electoral and career benefits: by initiating legislation, MPs send signals about their
quality and performance to the electorate and party leaders, who in turn reward them
(Bräuninger, Debus, and Wüst 2017; Bräuninger and Debus 2009; Gratton et al. 2015;
Loewen et al. 2014). However, previous research has largely neglected another potential
2motivation for legislative activity: private benefits.
In this research note, we investigate the causal effect of initiating legislation on private
benefits. We define private benefits as payments and gifts received from private actors,
such as private individuals, organizations and companies. We estimate the causal effect of
legislative activity on private benefits by exploiting a natural experiment in New Zealand,
where a list of Members of Parliament (MPs) is drawn at regular intervals of time through
a lottery system and is given the possibility of introducing bills. Our findings suggest that
initiating legislation affects the likelihood of receiving private benefits. We find that this
effect is driven by those MPs who propose bills that are successfully passed in parliament.
We conclude that private benefits depend on legislative performance.
We make sense of this finding by arguing that private actors allocate benefits to active
and successful parliamentarians. Not only does legislative activity signal information on
the parliamentarians’ performance to the electorate and the party, but also to private actors.
If a parliamentarian initiates bills that are adopted, the probability that she gets re-elected
and becomes an influential policy-maker in future increases (Gratton et al. 2015; Horiuchi
and John 2016; Loewen et al. 2014; Williams and Indridason 2018). Hence, private actors
allocate benefits to successful legislators to improve their reputation, access information
and potentially influence future policy outcomes.
Political scientists have already studied (private) members’ bills lotteries in Canada
(Loewen et al. 2014), the UK (Horiuchi and John 2016) and, more recently, New Zealand
itself (Williams and Indridason 2018). Yet, to our knowledge, this is the first study to
investigate the effect of legislative activity on private benefits. The high frequency with
which ballots take place and the disclosure of private interests make New Zealand the
perfect case where to study this effect.
3Study Design
We first describe the New Zealand ballot and explain why the ballot represents a valid
natural experiment. Then, we outline our estimation strategy and briefly discuss the data.
A detailed discussion of the New Zealand ballot as well as of the data and the measurement
of the variables can be found in the Appendix.
MPs in New Zealand that are not member of the cabinet can propose members’ bills.
The parliament usually debates members’ bills on every second Wednesday of the month.
The Order Paper, which contains the parliament’s agenda, includes a limited number of
members’ bills to be discussed in the first reading. According to Standing Order 281,
this limit is currently set to eight bills. If the parliament completes the first reading
of a member’s bill, a slot in the Order Paper becomes available. Then, the parliament
selects a new member’s bill via a ballot (i.e. a lottery). 1 To participate in the ballot,
parliamentarians submit a notice of their proposal to the Clerk. The parliamentarians
can only submit one proposal to the ballot. The bills that are not drawn are kept for the
following ballots, until they are drawn in the lottery, the member withdraws them or the
parliament term ends (New Zealand Parliament 2017). The legislative process in New
Zealand usually takes three readings, but most members’ bills fail in the first reading and
do not become law. In addition, the government can veto proposals that have substantial
budgetary implications. Detailed information on the member’s bill ballot can be found in
the Appendix.
We use this natural experiment, namely the random selection of members’ bills in
1There can be more than one slot available and hence more than one bill can be drawn
in the ballot.
4the New Zealand parliament, to estimate the causal effect of proposing a bill on private
benefits. Our estimation strategy focuses on examining how being drawn in the ballot
increases the chances for the MP to receive private benefits. The New Zealand ballot is
especially suited to study the link between legislative activity and private benefits. First,
little self-selection takes place. The majority of MPs who do not hold ministerial positions
enter regularly the ballot every year: in New Zealand every time roughly 80 MPs enter the
ballot. 2 Second, attrition levels are non-existent, namely in the period under analysis no
MP is drawn and then fails to propose legislation. This is the case also in the UK (Horiuchi
and John 2016), but we suspect it is especially the case in New Zealand, where, differently
from the UK (House of Commons 2016, 2010), MPs need to present a complete draft to
enter the ballot (since 2011) (New Zealand Parliament 2009, 2016). Third, differently
from similar procedures in place in other countries, such as the UK and Canada, the
New Zealand ballot takes place more than once a year. Hence, our data exhibits more
observations and higher variation.
Our study uses publicly available data on the members’ bills in New Zealand. We
focus on the period from 2009 until 2016, which includes 47 ballots. On average each
ballot selects two bills from 80 entries. Our dataset includes 3056 entries in the ballot and
117 drawn members’ bills. These drawn bills were proposed by MPs from the Labour
party (51), the National party (27), the Greens (20), New Zealand First (11), the Maori
Party (5), ACT (2) and Mana (1). We gathered data on whether the bill was drawn in the
ballot; whether the bill passed and, if not, at which stage the bill was rejected; the dates of
bill proposal and adoption or rejection. Out of the 117 bills, 16 were formally adopted.
2Williams and Indridason 2018 and Bowler 2010 show that the only determinant of
proposing a bill in the New Zealand and British parliament, respectively, is previous vote
share: MPs from safe seats tend to be less active.
5The topics of the bills vary substantially and include areas such as finance, economic
affairs, interior affair, environment, health and education.
We rely on unique data on the private benefits of New Zealand MPs. We measure
private benefits by using the data from the Register of Pecuniary and Other Specified
Interests of Members of Parliament, where MPs have to provide information on financial
benefits outside the parliament. We focus on two types of benefits: gifts and payments for
activities. Examples of gifts are trips and hospitality offered to MPs by companies and
associations and examples of payments for activities are consulting fees. 3 In the main
analysis, we use an ordinal variable which takes value: 0 if the MP does not receive any
gifts or payments in the same year of the ballot; value 1 if the MP receives either gifts or
payments in that year; value 2 if the MP receives both gifts and payments in that year. In
the Appendix, we use alternative measures of private benefits.
The regression analysis controls for a series of confounding factors: whether the MP
acts as a chair of a parliamentary committee, as a measure for seniority; the ministerial
experience of the MP, as a measure of the legislative experience; whether the MP was
elected through electorate or party vote, as a measure of the MP’s electoral incentives.
4 The Appendix discusses in more detail data and measurement issues and includes
descriptive statistics (see Table A1-A3 in the Appendix).
3A detailed description is provided in the Appendix.
4The election mechanism has strong implications on the MP’s incentive structure and
hence her behaviour. For instance, in Williams and Indridason 2018 proposing a bill in the
New Zealand parliament is found to increase the likelihood of the MP to climb the party
list (even though results are statistically weak). Yet, they find no relationship between
proposing a bill and vote share, for those MPs elected by constituency.
6Results
We analyze the data in two steps. First, we investigate whether being drawn in the ballot
is associated with receiving private benefits. Then, we examine whether the legislative
outcome influences private benefits. Before analyzing the data, we run a balance test to
confirm that the ballot selects bill proposals randomly (see Table A4 in the Appendix).
Table 1 shows the results of the ordered logistic regression model, which includes
control variables. We analyze the relationship between a bill being drawn and the private
benefits of the MP that proposed the bill. We control for the MP’s party, the legislative
period in which the ballot takes place and other control variables, such as theMP’s seniority
(whether she is a committee chair), whether she was elected via list or constituency and
her previous cabinet experience. The full regression output can be found in Table A5 in
the Appendix. We find a statistically significant and positive relationship between being
drawn in the ballot and receiving private benefits. The probability of receiving either gifts
or payments increases by 7 per cent after being drawn. The Appendix includes robustness
checks.
In Models 4 and 5, we examine the effect of initiating legislation on different subsets
of the data. We first remove those proposals which are drawn and rejected and then we
remove those which are drawn and adopted. We find a statistically significant difference
between those MPs who successfully passed a bill and those MPs whose bill was not
drawn in the first place. Yet, no difference is present between those MPs whose bill was
drawn but then rejected and those MPs whose bill was not drawn in the first place. We run
a series of robustness checks in the Appendix.
Next, we test whether the success of the legislative proposal influences private benefits.
We want to understand whether MPs are rewarded for proposing legislation that is adopted
7table 1 The Effect of Bill Drawn on Private Benefits (Same Year - Ordinal)
Private Benefits
Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample Successful Unsuccessful
VARIABLES
Bill Drawn 0.336* 0.326* 0.380* 1.550*** 0.178
(0.194) (0.193) (0.202) (0.528) (0.215)
Observations 3,056 3,056 3,056 2,955 3,040
Controls YES YES YES YES
Party FE YES YES YES
Legislative Period FE YES YES YES
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
in the legislative process. Hence, we focus exclusively on the drawn bills and tests whether
private benefits depend on whether the bill passes or not. The legislative success is likely
to be correlated with a number of variables related to the seniority and experience of
parliamentarians. We address this potential omitted variable bias by including the control
variables discussed in the previous section.
Table 2 examines the effect of passing a bill on private benefits (Table A6 shows the
full outputs of the regression model). The results show that legislative success affects
the private benefits of MPs. This effect is robust to different specifications and measures
of the outcome variable. If we focus on the successful bills, the predicted probability of
receiving either gifts or payments increases by 36 per cent. In the Appendix we run some
robustness tests.
Existing theoretical work on the role of signaling in legislative politics provides a
rationale for these findings (Caselli and Morelli 2004; Mattozzi and Merlo 2008; Gratton
et al. 2015; Buisseret and Bernhardt 2017). Private actors have an incentive to allocate
benefits to those MPs who are better able to influence policy-making. The private market
updates its beliefs on the capacity of an MP to influence policy-making in future in two
ways: by looking at her re-election probability and by looking at her probability to be a
8table 2 The Effect of Bill Passed on Private Benefits (Same Year - Ordinal)
Private Benefits
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES
Bill Passed 1.490** 1.354** 1.678**
(0.594) (0.615) (0.745)
Observations 117 117 117
Controls YES YES
Party FE YES
Legislative Period FE YES
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
key decision-maker in future. In other words, the market allocates private benefits to those
MPs who are more likely to stay in the parliament and to be key players in the foreseeable
future.
The probability of re-election depends, among other things, on whether the MP
proposes legislation. Williams and Indridason 2018 provide evidence for this in New
Zealand. We argue that, instead, the market updates the probability of an MP to be a key
decision-maker in the future based on her capacity to successfully pass legislation. Those
MPs able to pass legislation in the current parliament exhibit the quality and the support
from their parties needed to take an active role in the parliament in future. As a result,
where an MP’s bill is drawn and is successfully passed, both updates are positive: that
MP will be more likely to be re-elected and will be more likely to play a central role in
the parliament in future. That is why we find a statistically significant difference between
those MPs who successfully passed a bill and those MPs whose bill was not drawn in the
first instance. 5
5In the appendix, we show that MPs elected by list tend to be less likely to receive
private benefits. This effect is not robust in all model specifications, but the direction
of the effect provides indirect support for our argument. List MPs are less independent
9Instead, if an MP’s bill is drawn but is rejected by the parliament, her probability of
being re-elected will increase, but her probability to influence policy-making in future
will be lower. In other words, the two updates go in the opposite direction, balancing each
other out. That is why we find no difference between those MPs whose bill was drawn but
then rejected and those MPs whose bill was not drawn in the first place.
In conclusion, our findings suggest that private actors target active and successful
parliamentarians. These parliamentarians are both more likely to be re-elected and more
likely to be influential in the future. In contrast, parliamentarians that unsuccessfully
propose a bill have a higher re-election probability, but are not necessarily more likely
to become an influential decision-maker. Hence, private actors have fewer incentives to
allocate benefits to this group.
Conclusion
By proposing (successful) legislation, MPs can increase their approval rate in their
electorate (Williams and Indridason 2018), their chances of being re-elected (Loewen
et al. 2014) and making a career inside the parliament (Horiuchi and John 2016). In
this study, we find that MPs also receive immediate private benefits, as a result for being
more active and successful in the parliament. These benefits depend on whether the MP
manages to push the bill through. Hence, we conclude that in parliament there are clear
rewards in place for MPs to be more active.
These findings suggests that the market allocates private benefits to those MPs who are
and more subject to the power of party leaders and hence less likely to be able to make
an individual contribution to decision-making. We thank an anonymous reviewer for
suggesting this point.
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more likely to influence policy-making in future, which depends on the MP’s probability
to be re-elected and to be a key decision-makers in future. As a consequence, the private
market rewards those MPs who propose bills that are successfully passed, because they
are more likely to be re-elected and to be key policy-makers in future.
Future research may investigate the effect of legislative activity on parliamentarians’
private benefits by using data on the monetary value of benefits. We believe it would be
important to understand whether these benefits change the future behavior of politicians,
the quality of legislation or even encourage entry of different type of politicians.
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Appendix:
Legislative Activity and Private Benefits:
A Natural Experiment in New Zealand
The Member’s Bill Ballot in the New Zealand Parliament
Members of Parliament (MPs) who are not part of the government can introduce bills,
outside the government’s programme: these are called members’ bills (until 1995, they
were called private member bills). The purpose of members’ bills is to amend previous
legislation, gauge public attention to an issue and emphasise different party positions
(McGee 1994). Member’s bills can deal with different topics, but should have a minor
fiscal impact on the state (until 1996 member’s bills were not supposed to have any financial
implication at all) (New Zealand Parliament 2014b). These bills are usually discussed
every second Wednesday of the month, namely on Members’ day. The parliament adopts
a small number of member’s bills (in our sample, 15 per cent of drawn bills become
legislation), but all member’s bills may still affect the government’s agenda, by attracting
attention to certain issues (New Zealand Parliament 2009, 2016, 2017).
MPs can draft the bill herself or seek legal advice. It is common practice that the MP
consults with the party caucus to gather support from her party members, before putting
the bill through (Spindler 2009). A member’s bill can progress further and be written
down in the Order Paper by being drawn in the ballot or by being introduced by leave. The
2lottery system is by far the most common procedure (New Zealand Parliament 2017). In
the latter procedure, the MP asks if there are objections for the bill to the placed on the
Order Paper. In the last 10 years, only two member bills were introduced to the debate in
this manner (New Zealand Parliament 2017).
The New Zealand Parliament selects the member’s bills via a ballot. This ballot
takes place when a space on the Order Paper becomes available. 1 We first describe the
participation rules for the ballot and then the procedure for selecting the member’s bills
(New Zealand Parliament 2009). Members enter their bills in the ballot, by giving notice to
the Table Office and supplying a copy of the proposed bill (New Zealand Parliament 2009,
2016). The proposed bill is then posted on the parliament’s website and members can
publicly indicate their support for the bill prior to the ballot. 2 Until 2011, members were
only supposed to present a title and a brief description of the bill (New Zealand Parliament
2017). Members can only propose one bill at a time, but once their bill has been drawn,
they can propose another one (New Zealand Parliament 2017). Also, parliamentarians
cannot propose a bill if the parliament has already rejected the proposal in the same
calendar year (New Zealand Parliament 2014b).
Each bill is numbered and assigned to a token, which is then placed into a metal tin.
A politically neutral person draws a token for each vacant slot on the Order Paper (New
Zealand Parliament 2017). The bills that are not selected are kept for the next ballot
draw and re-numbered every time, until they are drawn, are withdrawn by the member or
1The Order Paper can include up to eight bills. This number has increased throughout
the years (New Zealand Parliament 2017).
2When two bills are the same in substance, a preliminary ballot between them is held
to determine which one enters the ballot. As this has occurred only twice throughout the
period under analysis, we decide to focus only on the final ballot and ignore the preliminary
one in these cases.
3reach the end of the parliament term (New Zealand Parliament 2017). 3 Every second
Wednesday of the month the House discusses local, private and members’ bills (New
Zealand Parliament 2009, 2016).
The number of ballots varies over years, from one in 2014 to nine in 2015 (no ballot is
usually held during election years, even though one ballot was held in 2014). In the last
seven years, a total of 47 draws have taken place. The frequency of ballots depends on the
available discussion time.
Data and Measurement
TablesA1-A3 provide descriptive statistics of ourmain variables and the relative frequencies
by party and legislative period.
Ballot Data
We use data on all 47 ballots, which took place in the period from 2009 until 2016. The
ballots include on average 80 entries and on average three bills were drawn. Our analysis
includes data from three legislative periods (2009-2011, 2011-2014, 2014-2017). We
gathered data on every bill which enters the ballot: whether the bill was drawn in the
ballot; whether the bill passed and, if not, at which stage the bill was rejected; the dates
when the bill was introduced to the floor and when it was passed/rejected. 4
3In the UK parliament this procedure is fully computerised.
4This information can be found here (last accessed July 2017).
4Private Benefits
We draw information on private benefits from the registers of interests of MPs, which
are available from 2006. 5 For every MP we have yearly information on her pecuniary
interests. In August 2005 the House amended its Standing Orders to provide a system
for members of Parliament to register these pecuniary interests. Standing Order 164 and
Appendix B of the Standing Orders provide details on what needs to be registered and how
to do so. These rules are amended every year. MPs declare their interests to the Registrar
of Pecuniary and Other Specified Interests, who advises them about what information is
required, and compiles their returns into the register. Once the register is complete, the
Registrar gives it to the Speaker, who submits it to the House. The booklet contains the
returns of those who were members at the time of publication and who were members as
of 31 January. New members who enter after 31 January are required to make an initial
return before the next round of annual return. This information, along with that in the
registers filed by MPs after the deadline, is stored separately and was included in the
analysis as well.
The register includes two main types of interests. The first type consists of the
following interests: the involvement of the MP in companies, trusts and organizations
in various role; employment outside the parliament; real properties owned by the MP;
her debtors and creditors; the superannuation schemes in which she participates. For this
type of interests the MP needs to report a snapshot of her interests at the effective date,
which is 31 January. The second main type of interests comprises: gifts the MP received;
discharged debts; payment for activities. These items are registered once, only for the year
5This information can be found here (last accessed July 2017).
5to which they relate.
We choose to gather information on gifts and payment for activities, as these items best
measure the private benefits derived from the parliamentary activity. The former include
gifts received while travelling on official business, corporate hospitality and services
provided at no cost, where the market value exceeds 500 dollars. Payments for activities
include fees for activities, such as speaking engagements, book royalties and so on (New
Zealand Parliament 2006, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014a, 2015). Examples
of payments for activities are consultancy fees from a tourism company to an MP involved
in rural affairs and director’s fees from a manufacturing company to an MP involved in
small business affairs. Examples of gifts instead are tickets to a gala dinner from a private
bank to an MP involved in industrial relations. Notice that the rules for the registration
of interests change almost every year. However, we examined in detail the notes for the
registers of interests and find that the definition of the various types of interests and the
procedures did not change substantively.
As MPs do not have to report the exact figures, we measure private benefits as an
ordinal variable which takes value: 0 if the MP does not receive any gifts or payments
in the same year of the ballot; value 1 if the MP receives either gifts or payments in that
year; value 2 if the MP receives both gifts and payments in that year (variable ‘ordinal -
same year’). We employ different measures and show the results in the Appendix. We
also measure private benefits as a dichotomous variable which takes value 0 if the MP
does not receive gifts or benefits and value 1 if she receives either one or the other, or both
(variable ‘dichotomous - same year’). Finally, we measure whether the MP receives gifts
and/or payments for activities (as dichotomous variable) in the same year, if the ballot
takes place before June, otherwise we look at the following year (we call this measure
‘dichotomous - next year’).
6table A1 Descriptive Statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES N mean sd min max
Bill Drawn 3,056 0.0383 0.192 0 1
Bill Passed 117 0.137 0.345 0 1
List v. Constituency 3,056 0.499 0.500 0 1
Cabinet Experience 3,056 0.425 0.494 0 1
Benefits (Dichotomous-Same Year) 3,056 0.284 0.451 0 1
Benefits (Dichotomous-Next Year) 2,508 0.247 0.431 0 1
Benefits (Ordinal-Same Year) 3,056 0.296 0.482 0 2
Chair 3,056 0.117 0.322 0 1
Other Variables
We have biographical data on every MP in our sample, namely the ministerial roles filled in
the past. 6 We also have information on whether the MP was elected through electorate or
party vote. Finally, we gathered data on whether the MP acts as parliamentary committee
chair. 7 Finally, in the regressions we calculate party fixed effects by pooling all the
observations from minor parties into a single category. We gathered all this information
between the end of 2016 and the end of 2017.
6This information can be found here (accessed November 2016).
7This information was provided by the New Zealand Parliamentary Service (contacted
November 2017).
7table A2 Descriptive Statistics - Party
Party Freq. Percent Cum.
Other (ACT, Mana, Progressive, United) 62 2.03 2.03
Green 609 19.93 21.96
Labour 1,257 41.13 63.09
Maori 65 2.13 65.22
National 744 24.35 89.56
NZ First 319 10.44 100.00
Total 3,056 100.00
8table A3 Descriptive Statistics - Legislative Period
Legislative Period Freq. Percent Cum.
First Period (2009-2011) 425 13.91 13.91
Second Period (2011-2014) 1,183 38.71 52.62
Third Period (2014-2017) 1,448 47.38 100.00
Total 3,056 100.00
9Balance Checks
As Table A4 shows, being drawn in the ballot does not depend on any individual
characteristic of the MP. This means that the ballot is a true natural experiment, as it
randomly selects MPs, regardless of how they are elected, their experience and so on.
Hence, relying on the ballot allows estimating the causal effects of legislative activity
on private benefits, controlling for the potential endogeneity in place. The legislative
period is statistically associated with the likelihood of being drawn. 8 This effect occurs
because the baseline legislative period, 2009-2011, includes fewer entries to the ballot in
comparison to the other periods. Thus, an entry to the ballot in the legislative periods
2011-2014 and 2014-2017 is less likely to be successful, with respect to an entry to the
ballot in the 2009-2011 period. 9
Finally, we check the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for the variables in the regression
models. The VIF measures how much variance of the coefficient of a variable is due to
the fact that the variable is linearly related to the other variables in the model. The VIFs
are well below the value 10 and hence we exclude high levels of multicollinearity.
8We dropped from the analysis those parties whose MPs were never drawn in the ballot
during the period under analysis, namely the Progressive Party and the United Party.
9Usually no ballot is held during election years and, hence, there are no observations
for 2011. In 2014, only one ballot was held. We do not consider obvservations from 2017
because the corresponding data on private benefits will be released in July 2017.
10
table A4 Balance Checks
Member Bill
(1)
VARIABLES Bill Drawn
List v. Constituency -0.0187
(0.206)
Green -0.127
(0.715)
Labour -0.107
(0.699)
Maori 0.636
(0.783)
National -0.0245
(0.731)
NZ First 0.0272
(0.749)
Chair -0.0640
(0.309)
Cabinet Experience 0.269
(0.259)
Second Period (2011-2014) -0.499*
(0.259)
Third Period (2014-2017) -0.489*
(0.257)
Constant -2.866***
(0.673)
Observations 3,056
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
11
Robustness Checks
In the following we provide the results of our robustness tests. Tables A7-A8 replicate the
analysis in Table 2, but use the different measures of the outcome variable (private benefits).
As stated, in the main body we measure whether the MP receives gifts and/or payments
for activities in the same year of the ballot as an ordinal variable. In the Appendix we
report the results also for the other measures. In Table A7 we measure private benefits as a
dichotomous variable which takes value 0 if the MP does not receive gifts or benefits and
value 1 if she receives either one or the other, or both (we call this measure ‘dichotomous
- same year’). In Table A8 we measure whether the MP receives gifts and/or payments
for activities (as dichotomous variable) in the same year if the ballot takes place before
June, otherwise we look at the following year (we call this measure ‘dichotomous - next
year’). The results are consistent. Finally, Table A9 replicates the results in Table 1 in
the research note, but replaces party fixed effects with a dummy variable which measures
whether the party was in government at that time. It should be noted that throughout the
period of analysis New Zealand had the same parties in government: National, United,
ACT and Maori parties. The results are robust and become stronger after controlling for
parties in government.
Table A10 shows the full regression outputs for the first three columns in Table 3.
Tables A11-12 replicate the results for the first three columns in Table 3 with the different
measures of private benefits as outcome variables. We also employ rare event estimation,
with the Stata package ‘firthlogit’ (Tables A13-14). A statistically significant relation is
found between the two variables in all the different specifications. Table A15 replicates the
results for the last three columns in Table 3, Tables A16-A17 use the different measures
for private benefits and Tables A18-A19 use the the package ‘firthlogit’. No statistically
12
significant relationship between the two main variables is found here.
Tables A20-A21-A22 replicate Table 1-2 in the research note, but we collapsed the
dataset at bill level. Presenting a bill affects the likelihood of receiving private benefits.
The results are even stronger than in the main analysis. As shown in Table A21-A22, the
findings on the successful bill are consistent with our main analysis. Finally, Table A23
uses the generalized ordinal logit model with the Stata gologit2 autofit option.
table A5 The Effect of Bill Drawn on Private Benefits (Ordinal - Same Year) - Full Output
Private Benefits
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES
Bill Drawn 0.336* 0.326* 0.380*
(0.194) (0.193) (0.202)
List v. Constituency -0.346 -0.726**
(0.293) (0.313)
Cabinet Experience 0.474 0.628
(0.289) (0.472)
Chair 0.788** 0.329
(0.349) (0.348)
Observations 3,056 3,056 3,056
Party FE YES
Legislative Period FE YES
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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table A6 The Effect of Bill Passed on Private Benefits (Ordinal - Same Year) - Full Output
Private Benefits
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES
Bill Passed 1.490** 1.354** 1.678**
(0.594) (0.615) (0.745)
List v. Constituency 0.025 -0.406
(0.488) (0.488)
Cabinet Experience 0.006 0.784
(0.476) (0.678)
Chair 0.822 0.067
(0.597) (0.623)
Observations 117 117 117
Party FE YES
Legislative Period FE YES
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
table A7 The Effect of Bill Passed on Private Benefits (Dichotomous - Same Year)
Private Benefits
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES
Bill Passed 1.325** 1.205** 1.206*
(0.549) (0.565) (0.643)
List v. Constituency 0.036 0.104
(0.504) (0.507)
Cabinet Experience 0.020 1.002
(0.492) (0.779)
Chair 1.053 0.123
(0.644) (0.710)
Constant -0.815*** -0.949*** -1.697*
(0.235) (0.330) (1.024)
Observations 117 117 117
Party FE YES
Legislative Period FE YES
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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table A8 The Effect of Bill Passed on Private Benefits (Dichotomous - Next Year)
Private Benefits
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES
Bill Passed 1.623*** 1.527** 1.274**
(0.583) (0.595) (0.641)
List v. Constituency -0.350 -0.722
(0.618) (0.659)
Cabinet Experience -0.173 0.966
(0.628) (1.142)
Chair 0.507 -0.250
(0.873) (0.832)
Constant -1.371*** -1.150*** 1.100
(0.312) (0.436) (1.899)
Observations 100 100 100
Party FE YES
Legislative Period FE YES
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
table A9 The Effect of Bill Drawn on Private Benefits (Ordinal - Same Year) - Government
Private Benefits - Government
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES
Bill Drawn 0.336* 0.326* 0.389**
(0.194) (0.193) (0.197)
List v. Constituency -0.346 -0.576**
(0.293) (0.292)
Cabinet Experience 0.474 0.901***
(0.289) (0.329)
Chair 0.788** 0.139
(0.349) (0.334)
Government 1.021***
(0.341)
Observations 3,056 3,056 3,056
Legislative Period FE YES
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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table A10 The Effect of Bill Drawn on Private Benefits (Ordinal - Same Year) - Successful Bills-
Full Output
Private Benefits
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES
Bill Drawn 1.659*** 1.556*** 1.550***
(0.613) (0.589) (0.528)
List v. Constituency -0.365 -0.750**
(0.294) (0.316)
Cabinet Experience 0.505* 0.627
(0.288) (0.468)
Chair 0.772** 0.337
(0.351) (0.347)
Observations 2,955 2,955 2,955
Party FE YES
Legislative Period FE YES
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
table A11 The Effect of Bill Drawn on Private Benefits (Dichotomous - Same Year) - Successful
Bills
Private Benefits
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES
Bill Drawn 1.448*** 1.387*** 1.381***
(0.539) (0.526) (0.482)
List v. Constituency -0.357 -0.735**
(0.295) (0.309)
Cabinet Experience 0.526* 0.706
(0.292) (0.479)
Chair 0.772** 0.317
(0.343) (0.336)
Constant -0.938*** -1.097*** -0.526
(0.146) (0.237) (0.862)
Observations 2,955 2,955 2,955
Party FE YES
Legislative Period FE YES
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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table A12 The Effect of Bill Drawn on Private Benefits (Dichotomous - Next Year) - Successful
Bills
Private Benefits
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES
Bill Drawn 1.368*** 1.331*** 1.127**
(0.509) (0.510) (0.482)
List v. Constituency -0.263 -0.734**
(0.333) (0.365)
Cabinet Experience 0.434 0.345
(0.326) (0.432)
Chair 0.503 0.027
(0.389) (0.353)
Constant -1.116*** -1.257*** -0.944
(0.162) (0.258) (0.875)
Observations 2,424 2,424 2,424
Party FE YES
Legislative Period FE YES
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
table A13 The Effect of Bill Drawn on Private Benefits (Dichotomous - Same Year) - Successful
Bills - Rare Event
Private Benefits
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES
Bill Drawn 1.417*** 1.355*** 1.345**
(0.501) (0.511) (0.536)
List v. Constituency -0.356*** -0.731***
(0.090) (0.104)
Cabinet Experience 0.524*** 0.700***
(0.088) (0.150)
Chair 0.771*** 0.317**
(0.121) (0.146)
Constant -0.937*** -1.096*** -0.515*
(0.0410) (0.064) (0.285)
Observations 2,955 2,955 2,955
Party FE YES
Legislative Period FE YES
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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table A14 The Effect of Bill Drawn on Private Benefits (Dichotomous - Next Year) - Successful
Bills - Rare Event
Private Benefits
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES
Bill Drawn 1.352*** 1.314*** 1.106**
(0.491) (0.497) (0.507)
List v. Constituency -0.262** -0.729***
(0.103) (0.116)
Cabinet Experience 0.433*** 0.341**
(0.100) (0.163)
Chair 0.504*** 0.030
(0.141) (0.169)
Constant -1.116*** -1.255*** -0.916
(0.047) (0.074) (0.327)
Observations 2,424 2,424 2,424
Party FE YES
Legislative Period FE YES
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
table A15 The Effect of Bill Drawn on Private Benefits (Ordinal - Same Year) - Unsuccessful
Bills - Full Output
Private Benefits
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES
Bill Drawn 0.119 0.123 0.178
(0.203) (0.207) (0.215)
List v. Constituency -0.342 -0.722**
(0.295) (0.314)
Cabinet Experience 0.469 0.615
(0.290) (0.477)
Chair 0.783** 0.341
(0.354) (0.350)
Observations 3,040 3,040 3,040
Party FE YES
Legislative Period FE YES
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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table A16 The Effect of Bill Drawn on Private Benefits (Dichotomous - Same Year) - Successful
Bills Dropped
Private Benefits
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES
Bill Drawn 0.123 0.127 0.185
(0.205) (0.209) (0.217)
List v. Constituency -0.332 -0.708**
(0.296) (0.308)
Cabinet Experience 0.488* 0.684
(0.293) (0.488)
Chair 0.776** 0.318
(0.348) (0.340)
Constant -0.938*** -1.093*** -0.383
(0.146) (0.236) (0.883)
Observations 3,040 3,040 3,040
Party FE YES
Legislative Period FE YES
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
table A17 The Effect of Bill Drawn on Private Benefits (Dichotomous - Next Year) - Unsuccessful
Bills
Private Benefits
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES
Bill Drawn -0.255 -0.258 -0.274
(0.274) (0.280) (0.288)
List v. Constituency -0.250 -0.716*
(0.336) (0.366)
Cabinet Experience 0.395 0.285
(0.331) (0.443)
Chair 0.518 0.049
(0.389) (0.352)
Constant -1.116*** -1.246*** -0.784
(0.162) (0.257) (0.904)
Observations 2,492 2,492 2,492
Party FE YES
Legislative Period FE YES
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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table A18 The Effect of Bill Drawn on Private Benefits (Dichotomous - Same Year) - Unsuccessful
Bills- Rare Event
Private Benefits
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES
Bill Drawn 0.132 0.136 0.192
(0.218) (0.221) (0.230)
List v. Constituency -0.331*** -0.705***
(0.088) (0.102)
Cabinet Experience 0.487*** 0.679***
(0.087) (0.149)
Chair 0.776*** 0.318*
(0.120) (0.144)
Constant -0.937*** -1.091*** -0.376
(0.041) (0.064) (0.276)
Observations 3,040 3,040 3,040
Party FE YES
Legislative Period FE YES
Clustered errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
table A19 The Effect of Bill Drawn on Private Benefits (Dichotomous - Next Year) - Unsuccessful
Bills - Rare Event
Private Benefits
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES
Bill Drawn -0.234 -0.237 -0.253
(0.272) (0.274) (0.283)
List v. Constituency -0.250** -0.711***
(0.102) (0.114)
Cabinet Experience 0.394*** 0.282*
(0.099) (0.162)
Chair 0.519*** -0.050
(0.153) (0.167)
Constant -1.116*** -1.244*** -0.762*
(0.0473) (0.0742) (0.311)
Observations 2,492 2,492 2,492
Party FE YES
Legislative Period FE YES
Clustered errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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table A20 The Effect of Bill Drawn on Private Benefits (Collapsed) - Bill Level
Private Benefits - Collapsed
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES
Bill Drawn 0.423** 0.413* 0.406*
(0.213) (0.216) (0.221)
List v. Constituency 0.0338 -0.221
(0.217) (0.219)
Cabinet Experience 0.227 0.664***
(0.208) (0.242)
Chair 0.621** 0.0424
(0.254) (0.276)
Constant -0.965*** -1.155*** -2.490***
(0.109) (0.163) (0.346)
Observations 679 679 679
Party FE YES
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
table A21 The Effect of Bill Passed on Private Benefits (Collapsed) - Bill Level
Private Benefits - Collapsed
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES
Bill Passed 1.234** 1.110* 0.991
(0.561) (0.585) (0.609)
List v. Constituency 0.0948 -0.138
(0.450) (0.472)
Cabinet Experience -0.148 0.553
(0.449) (0.554)
Chair 0.997 0.0111
(0.649) (0.666)
Constant -0.723*** -0.800** -2.715***
(0.215) (0.317) (0.741)
Observations 117 117 117
Party FE YES
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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table A22 The Effect of Bill Drawn on Private Benefits (Collapsed) - Successful andUnsuccessful
Bills - Bill Level
Private Benefits - Collapsed
Successful Successful Successful Unsuccessful Unsuccessful Unsuccessful
VARIABLES
Bill Drawn 1.871 1.747 1.351 -0.101 -0.109 -0.0952
(1.245) (1.150) (1.174) (0.427) (0.439) (0.430)
List v. Constituency 0.0008 -0.271 0.077 -0.237
(0.237) (0.253) (0.221) (0.237)
Cabinet Experience 0.363 0.0695 0.195 -0.102
(0.223) (0.335) (0.213) (0.341)
Chair 0.532* 0.380 0.568** 0.432
(0.276) (0.309) (0.264) (0.294)
Constant -0.945*** -1.169*** -0.557 -0.921*** -1.110*** -0.120
(0.108) (0.171) (0.597) (0.104) (0.162) (0.532)
Observations 578 578 577 663 663 662
Party FE YES YES
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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table A23 The Effect of Bill Drawn on Private Benefits (Generalized Ordinal Logit)
Private Benefits
Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample Successful Unsuccessful
VARIABLES
0
Bill Drawn 0.336* 0.326* 0.390* 1.538*** 0.191
(0.194) (0.193) (0.199) (0.503) (0.217)
List v. Constituency -0.346 -0.396 -0.423 -0.394
(0.293) (0.294) (0.294) (0.296)
Cabinet Experience 0.474 0.732** 0.767** 0.726**
(0.289) (0.333) (0.330) (0.335)
Chair 0.788 0.476 0.460 0.476
(0.349) (0.353) (0.354) (0.356)
Observations 3,056 3,056 3,056 2,955 3,040
Party FE YES YES YES
Legislative Period FE YES YES YES
1
Bill Drawn 0.336* 0.326* 0.390* 1.538*** 0.191
(0.194) (0.193) (0.199) (0.503) (0.217)
List v. Constituency -0.346 -0.396 -0.423 -0.394
(0.293) (0.294) (0.294) (0.296)
Cabinet Experience 0.474 0.732** 0.767** 0.726**
(0.289) (0.333) (0.330) (0.335)
Chair 0.788 0.476 0.460 0.476
(0.349) (0.353) (0.354) (0.356)
Observations 3,056 3,056 3,056 2,955 3,040
Party FE YES YES YES
Legislative Period FE YES YES YES
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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